



How should monetary policy be carried out in the long-run? Recent literature proves
the optimality of the Friedman rule, implying that the nominal interest rate should on av-
erage be zero. Prices are then expected to decrease over time, since the real interest rate is
positive. According to the Friedman rule, the Government should not tax money, despite
the need to resort to distorting taxes to finance public expenditure.
1. INTRODUCTION
How should monetary policy be carried out in
the long-run — and also in the short-run — in re-
sponse to economic shocks? The study of the de-
sirable monetary policy requires the prior identifi-
cation of both long- and short-run effects of
money. Only then follows the identification of the
best policy strategy, i.e., the one leading to a better
resource allocation in the economy. To attain this,
it will also be necessary to use models that both re-
produce the relevant facts and that address issue
of optimality.
Long-run effects of monetary policy are well
known and adequate models are available to mea-
sure such effects. On the contrary, research on the
short-term effects of money still arouses some con-
troversy as regards both the adequate theoretical
model and the identification of the facts. There-
fore, the answers to the question of how short-run
monetary policy should be carried out are far from
being definitive. Partly on these grounds, this arti-
cle focuses on the presentation of the known find-
ings on long-run optimal monetary policy.
In the identification of the long-run effects of
money, the quantitative theory is consensual.
Economies with higher money growth rates are
economies with higher inflation rates and higher
nominal interest rates. Effects on real interest rates
and on growth rates are negligible (charts 1 and
2(1)). Even if there are no effects on growth there
will be significant effects of inflation on resource
allocation. Hence the issue of long-run monetary
policy optimality is justified. Since it is a long-run
policy, decisions concern the average growth rates
of money and prices and secular averages of nom-
inal interest rates. The distortions generated by a
high average inflation rate or by high nominal in-
terest rates are similar to those of any other tax.
High inflation taxes transactions that use money,
making consumption and investment costlier and
deviating resources to leisure or to alternative
ways of making transactions. As any other tax, a
high average inflation also enables the govern-
ment to collect more revenue, as it may finance
deficits through the issuing of money, instead of
paying high interest rates on the public debt. The
objective of long-run monetary policy is to mini-
mise the effect of distortions generated by the in-
flation tax, while taking into account that if this tax
is cut, other taxes — also distorting — will have to
be raised to finance public expenditure. Answers
to the following issues are given in this article:
Banco de Portugal / Economic bulletin / March 1999 25
Articles
* The opinions of the paper represent the views of the authors,
and are not necessarily those of the Banco de Portugal. All er-
rors and omissions are the authors’ responsibility.
** Economic Research Department. (1) Lucas (1996).what is the optimal average inflation level, when
the government needs to collect distorting taxes to
finance public expenditure? What should be the
average growth rate of money? What is the nomi-
nal interest rate on longer-term bonds, resulting
from optimal long-run monetary policy?
In the Optimum Quantity of Money (1969), Mil-
ton Friedman proposed a monetary policy rule
able of generating the lowest nominal interest
rates possible: “the rule on the optimum quantity
of money is met through an inflation rate generat-
ing a nominal interest rate equal to zero”. The ar-
guments defended by Friedman are simple Pareto
optimality arguments which only hold true if taxes
are non-distorting. A good with a zero production
cost — indeed, money has very low marginal pro-
duction costs — should have a price also equal to
zero. As the nominal interest rate is the price of
holding money — since it corresponds to private
agents’ foregone revenue when they opt for hold-
ing this more liquid asset — the long-term nomi-
nal interest rate should, according to Friedman, be
equal to zero. This rule for the nominal interest
rate means that prices should decrease on average
at a rate equal to that of the long-term real interest
rate: the money stock must decrease at a rate con-
sistent with the required deflation.
The leading criticism to the Friedman rule was
made by Phelps (1973), who used the optimum
taxation principles of Ramsey (1927): in the ab-
sence of non-distorting taxes, the optimal taxation
problem consists of financing an exogenous se-
quence of public expenditure in the less distorting
way. In this context, the marginal distortion
caused by one unit of tax revenue should be equal
for all taxes. Implicitly it would seem that money
should also be taxed, as any other good, and there-
fore the price of money should be higher than its
production cost. The long-term nominal interest
rate should, therefore, be higher than zero.
Recent developments in the general equilib-
rium monetary theory questioned the intuition of
Phelps and recovered the bounty of the Friedman
rule. Despite the need to resort to distorting taxes,
money should not be taxed. This finding holds
true in an economic environment where money is
necessary for transaction purposes, explicitly
through a transactions function where money can
be replaced with other production factors(2). Con-
sidering that in this environment money is an in-
termediate good, the optimal taxation results of
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) concerning interme-
diate goods could apparently be invoked. These
results suggest that under certain conditions inter-
mediate goods should not be taxed. However, the
conditions of the theorem of Diamond and
Mirrlees (namely the linearity condition of the
production function) do not occur necessarily in
monetary models. For example if we think, as it is
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(2) Kimbrough (1986), Faig (1986, 1988), Guidoti and Végh (1983),
Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1983) demonstrate the result, im-
posing restrictive conditions. Correia and Teles (1996) general-
ise these conditions.reasonable, that the transactions technology pro-
posed by Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) is a
good description of the transactions process, the
structure of production no longer has constant re-
turns to scale, hence making taxation on interme-
diate goods desirable.
In an environment closer to that used by Phelps
(1973), where money is an input to the provision
of liquidity services — modelled as a final good —
Correia and Teles (1999) derived optimal taxation
rules and concluded also in this context, that the
Friedman rule is the general rule of optimum
(non) taxation of money. Therefore, they showed
that the intuition of Phelps cannot be applied to
money, because money is a zero-cost good, taxed
through a specific tax, the nominal interest rate.
The optimum taxation results of Ramsey (1927), or
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), refer to ad valorem
tax rates on goods with a positive production cost.
It follows that the general result according to
which these tax rates should be positive does not
imply that the specific tax must also be positive,
when the production cost of the good is close to
zero. Indeed, in this case the optimal is also close
to zero.
2. OPTIMAL INFLATION
This section describes in detail the optimal
money taxation finding in Correia and Teles
(1996). To address the issue of what should be
long-term optimal inflation when all taxes are dis-
torting, Correia and Teles (1996) use a monetary
model where money is used in transactions in a
way that the time spent in transactions is a func-
tion of the volume of transactions and the stock of
money. In this model, money is an intermediate
good necessary to carry out transactions. A possi-
ble justification for the transactions function —
and the only one with a microeconomic theoretical
foundation — is the transactions technology pro-
posed in Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956), accord-
ing to which time spent in transactions is a func-
tion of the ratio of the volume of transactions per
currency unit to the number of visits to the bank.
This transactions function is homogeneous of de-
gree zero.
In the model, there is a large number of house-
holds with endowments of time that can be used
for leisure, the production of an aggregate good,
the production of transactions, or the production
of money itself. Transactions have a cost, mea-
sured in terms of the time dedicated to that activ-
ity. Money can reduce this cost. This friction al-
lows money to have a value. Households have
preferences over consumption goods and leisure.
Markets for goods and labour and markets for as-
sets, money and nominal bonds exist in every pe-
riod. A benevolent government chooses the opti-
mal combination of income tax and inflation tax,
which finance an exogenous sequence of public
expenditures.
In this economic environment, where money is
an intermediate good, Correia and Teles (1996)
concluded that, when money has a negligible pro-
duction cost, it is desirable that money is no longer
taxed, regardless of the degree of homogeneity of
the transactions function. If on the contrary money
requires significant production costs, then taxing
money would be optimal, the tax rate depending
on the level of homogeneity of the transactions
function.
The result that intermediate goods should not
be taxed in a second best environment — when
technology exhibits constant returns to scale — is
well known since Diamond and Mirrlees (1971).
They proved that production efficiency is a charac-
teristic of the second best solution when taxes on
consumption are available. As a corollary to this
result, intermediate goods should not be taxed.








n 2Production efficiency means that labour is opti-
mally allocated — as in the first best — between
different uses. This means that the marginal pro-
ductivity of labour used in the production of a
given good equals the marginal productivity of
the intermediate good (used in producing that
good), times the marginal productivity of labour
(used in producing the intermediate good). In the
monetary model with one aggregate good and no
capital, the consumption tax proposed by Dia-
mond and Mirrlees (1971) is equivalent to a single
tax on labour, the intermediate goods being un-
taxed. These optimal tax rules are rules on the
value of ad valorem taxes.
The taxation rules of Diamond and Mirrlees
(1971) do not apply directly to the monetary econ-
omy for two reasons: because the production struc-
ture is a specific one, and because there are natural
constraints on the taxes that can be collected. The
distinctive features of the production structure in
the monetary model are: first, the consumption
good is produced using labour and transactions ac-
cording to a Leontief production structure; second,
the interesting transactions functions — like the
Baumol-Tobin one — do not present constant re-
turns to scale. The other distinctive feature is that
time spent in the production of transactions cannot
be taxed, since the activity of transactions does not
feed through to the market.
In the context of the monetary model, efficiency
in production is attained when money and time
spent in its production are not taxed, and only
time spent in the production of the good is taxed.
If the transactions function presents constant re-
turns to scale, production efficiency is desirable,
and so money is not to be taxed. If, however, the
transactions function does not exhibit constant re-
turns to scale — as is the case of the Baumol-Tobin
function — then distorting production would al-
ready be first best, and the optimal ad valorem tax
on money would no longer be zero. But a positive
ad valorem tax corresponds to a zero unit tax when
the production cost of money tends to be zero.
Since the inflation tax is a unit tax, the result of the
optimality of the Friedman rule is ultimately ex-
plained by the free good characteristic of money.
To understand deeply these optimal money taxa-
tion results, it is useful to think of the monetary
economy in terms of an equivalent real economy
with three vertical levels of production. The equiva-
lent real economy is represented in Diagram 1.
Here, economic agents have preferences over con-
sumption, c, and leisure, h. c is produced using
transactions, e, and labour, n1, according to a
Leontief production function, c = min (e, n1,). The
production of e requires time, s, and an intermediate
good, m. The intermediate good m is produced with
labour, n2, at a constant marginal rate (m = α n2). To-
tal time available in the economy is normalised to
one unit. The taxation structure is such that c,n 1, n2
and m can be taxed, but e and s cannot be taxed.
These constraints on the taxation capacity are natu-
ral constraints of the equivalent monetary model be-
cause transactions are not marketed.
Assuming that function s=l (e, m) is homoge-
neous of degree k, the optimal taxation solution is
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when the tax rate on labour used in money pro-
duction is zero, τ 2 =0 .
In this case, efficiency in the production of
transactions, e, is optimal only when the produc-
tion function of e is constant returns to scale. When
there are profits, i.e., when the transactions func-
tion does not exhibit constant returns to scale, the
effect of taxes on profits explains the deviations
from production efficiency in the second best solu-
tion. When k ≠ 1, the possibility of non-zero profits
and the absence of a tax on those profits justifies
optimal taxation rules that induce a reduction in
profits. The reduction of profits, even when these
are negative, is equivalent to a lump-sum tax.
Thus the second best solution allows for a produc-
tion distortion, through the taxation of intermedi-
ate goods, so as to reduce profits implicit in trans-
actions production.
The reason why efficiency in the production of
e is attained when τ 2 and τ m are equal to zero is
that τ s is usually equal to zero. Therefore, sup-
pressing taxation of labour used in the production
of m, and taxation of m itself, maintains the effi-
ciency in this transactions production branch.
Since transactions and hours worked are used
in fixed proportions in the production of the con-
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taxation of n1. For this reason the Ramsey solution,
even with the above mentioned specific con-
straints of the tax system (i.e., s and e cannot be
taxed), is a second best, not a third or fourth best.
If imposing τ 2 equal to τ 1 , production efficiency
would imply a negative τ m.Therefore we can assert
that the result achieved for constant returns to
scale technologies (i.e., that m should not be taxed)
ensures production efficiency, but due to the con-
straints of the taxation instruments it does not pro-
vide a natural extension to the Diamond and
Mirrlees result. In this case, the intermediate good
is not taxed but labour income is taxed at very dif-
ferent rates, depending on the sector where they
were originated.
Income from labour in the production of
money and in the production of transactions is not
taxed, while income from labour in the production
of the consumer good is taxed at a positive rate.
When m is a free good, if the nominal interest
rate equals zero — meaning that money is being
fully used (lm = 0) — the marginal effect of m on
profit is zero. Despite the fact that, for transactions
functions that are homogeneous of order k ≠ 1, the
level of implicit profits is different from zero and
m generally exerts a marginal effect on profits.
Moreover, at the satiation point of real money (i.e.,
the point where the free good has zero marginal
productivity) this effect is null. Therefore the satia-
tion point defines the optimum quantity of money.
This finding can be interpreted as the limit result
of the optimum unit tax charged on an intermedi-
ate good that uses resources, when the costs of
producing the good become arbitrarily small. The
intuition is that the unit tax equivalent to a finite
ad valorem tax on a good with an arbitrarily low
production cost, is arbitrarily low.
In any case, zero variable production costs of
money stand as the essential assumption to derive
the optimality of the Friedman rule. We take this
assumption for granted despite the evidence of
significant fixed costs associated with money cre-
ation. Therefore, money as a free primary input —
and not as an intermediate good — is the relevant
quantitatively reasonable assumption, as well as
the fundamental theoretical justification behind
the robustness of Friedman’s optimality rule.
3. CONCLUSIONS
Long-run average inflation has real effects on
the level of economic activity. To lessen these ef-
fects, the literature on long-run monetary policy
rules recommends a policy that is consistent with
close to zero nominal interest rates. According to
the Friedman rule, of 1969, this corresponds to de-
flation. This result is surprising, since it holds even
when the need the government has to resort to dis-
torting taxes, to finance public expenditure, is
taken into account (Correia and Teles, 1996; 1999).
The basic intuition of the finding is that the nomi-
nal interest rate is a unit tax rate on a good
(money) with a very low production cost. There-
fore, even if in proportional terms it were optimal
to tax money at a high rate, the equivalent specific
tax is very low. Once optimum policy is defined,
the quantitative issue of what are the welfare gains
from reducing nominal interest rates to virtually
null levels should be addressed. Correia and Teles
(1994) calculate that the gain from reducing the
nominal interest rate from 5 per cent to the Fried-
man rule amounts to about 1 per cent for GDP(3).
This limit result — i.e., the optimality of
non-taxation of money — can, however, be ad-
justed according to various considerations — for
instance, taxation of the underground economy,
high tax administration costs, or costs due to price
changes. Since the underground economy is pre-
cisely one sector that cannot be taxed through the
tax system, for efficiency and equity reasons, the
inflation tax should be used to this end. In quanti-
tative terms, the optimal long-run inflation levels
are marginally positive(4). High costs of collecting
taxes on consumption or income can also explain a
deviation from the Friedman rule — still a minor
deviation, amounting to about one percentage
point in the nominal interest rate(5). Costs of price
changes can also explain deviations from the
Friedman rule, towards the price stability objec-
tive.
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(3) See also Lucas (1994).
(4) Nicolini (1998).
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